The Iran–US–Israel War: What Is Next?

Background

The current war began on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched joint strikes against Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure. The attacks killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and set off months of retaliatory missile, drone, and proxy warfare across the region (Britannica, 2026). For a time, diplomacy appeared to offer a way out. An April 8 ceasefire created a fragile pause, followed by a June 17 memorandum of understanding (MOU). Under that arrangement, Iran agreed to allow vessels to pass freely through the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days while negotiations began over the strait’s future governance, Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and possible sanctions relief (House of Commons Library, 2026).

That opening did not last. By mid-July, the truce had collapsed. U.S. forces had carried out six consecutive nights of strikes on Iranian infrastructure, while Iran had closed the strait again and fired on commercial vessels. Tehran also warned that its retaliation “will spread to new areas” (Al Jazeera, July 16, 2026). The conflict has therefore returned to a familiar pattern: military pressure, economic coercion, and limited diplomacy operating at the same time. Each side still appears interested in negotiation, but neither is prepared to make the first meaningful concession.

The Core Sticking Points

At the center of the standoff are two positions that remain extremely difficult to reconcile. Washington insists that any final agreement must require “zero enrichment” and the surrender of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. Tehran, meanwhile, views its ability to control shipping through the Strait of Hormuz as one of its most valuable sources of leverage. It is unlikely to relinquish that leverage unless the United States recognizes some form of Iranian authority over the waterway (Critical Threats Project, July 11, 2026). This is more than a disagreement over technical terms. It is a contest over who will give way first.

Sina Azodi of George Washington University describes the confrontation as a mutual test of will, with each side attempting to force the other into capitulation. Ali Ahmadi of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy offers a slightly different interpretation. In his view, Iran has treated the possibility of broader regional escalation primarily as a bargaining threat rather than as an outcome it genuinely wants to pursue (Al Jazeera, July 16, 2026). That distinction matters. If escalation is still being used as leverage, negotiations remain possible. But the longer the fighting continues, the greater the risk that threats intended to influence talks will create events neither side can easily control.

Iran’s Internal Fault Lines

Iran’s position cannot be understood through its military actions alone. The war has also intensified a succession crisis inside Tehran, and that struggle now shapes nearly every important negotiating decision. After Khamenei’s killing, the Assembly of Experts moved quickly to install his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as Supreme Leader. The decision was backed by IRGC commanders, Basij leaders, and hardline principalists loyal to Saeed Jalili. Reformists and moderates associated with former presidents Khatami and Rouhani saw the appointment differently. To them, Mojtaba represented continuity with his father’s hardline rule rather than a meaningful change in direction (Foreign Affairs, March 2026).

The outcome was not entirely unexpected. During his final years, Ali Khamenei had worked to shape the Assembly of Experts while the Guardian Council disqualified moderate candidates. Carnegie Endowment analysts argued that these steps left the assembly with little realistic room to select anyone other than another hardliner once the succession process began under wartime conditions (Carnegie Endowment, April 2026). Yet Mojtaba’s appointment has not produced a unified regime. Alhurra reporting identifies at least four competing power centers: the ideological hardline faction closest to the new Supreme Leader; a separate financial and security network surrounding parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf; the reformist camp; and traditional conservatives. The most important tension may now be between Ghalibaf’s network and the more ideological hardliners, particularly over how much Iran should concede to Washington (Alhurra, June 2026).

Other reporting has gone further, suggesting that the IRGC has effectively sidelined moderate voices from both military and diplomatic decision-making (17GEN4 News, April 2026). That assessment should be treated cautiously because it comes from a less established outlet. The more measured analysis offered by CFR and Carnegie nevertheless points in the same general direction: Iran’s security establishment has become increasingly influential, while civilian moderates have less ability to shape the state’s response. These internal divisions were visible in the way the MOU was presented to the Iranian public. Mojtaba Khamenei acknowledged that he had initially held a different view on negotiations with Washington before ultimately authorizing the talks. The wording was carefully chosen. Hardliners could interpret it as evidence that he had not abandoned his principles, while pragmatists could argue that he had shown enough flexibility to pursue diplomacy (Iran News Update, June 2026).

The debate extended into parliament and the security establishment. Hardliners and Paydari Front figures aligned with Jalili opposed concessions on uranium enrichment and Hormuz fees. Nevertheless, the Supreme National Security Council — chaired by IRGC figures but responsible for implementing the agreement — ultimately ratified the deal. This suggests that pragmatic security officials, rather than civilian moderates, may currently represent the strongest institutional check on the most ideological elements of the regime (Al Jazeera, June 16, 2026).

For that reason, any durable off-ramp may depend less on the traditional struggle between reformists and hardliners. The more immediate question is whether IRGC-aligned pragmatists such as Ghalibaf can continue to outmaneuver ideological hardliners such as Jalili. They must do so while the regime is already under pressure from economic protests that began in December 2025 and continue to weaken its legitimacy (CFR, February 2026).

Scenarios Ahead

1. The first is a return to managed de-escalation. Under this scenario, both sides would revive the MOU process, restore regular tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and resume indirect negotiations. This remains possible because Washington and Tehran have periodically signaled an interest in talks even while military strikes were underway (Soufan Center, 2026). Neither side appears ready to accept the other’s core demands, but both may eventually conclude that a limited arrangement is preferable to an open-ended war.
2. A second scenario — and perhaps the most likely in the near term — is continued attrition. Strikes, missile attacks, maritime disruption, and economic pressure could persist without producing either a decisive victory or a lasting settlement. CFR analysts Elisa Ewers and Ariane Tabatabai note that the conflict has already challenged several early U.S. planning assumptions, particularly those concerning Iran’s resilience and its willingness to use the closure of Hormuz as an economic weapon. That decision affects roughly one-fifth of the world’s energy supply and extends the consequences of the war far beyond the immediate region (CFR, April 2026).
3. The third possibility is a much wider regional conflict. Attacks on Gulf shipping, renewed fighting in Lebanon, or escalating violence in Gaza could draw additional states into the confrontation. The danger is not only that Iran or the United States might deliberately expand the war. A miscalculation, an attack with unexpected casualties, or a proxy action that crosses an unspoken red line could also trigger a broader escalation. CFR’s 2026 conflict risk assessment had already placed renewed conflict between Iran and Israel among its top-tier concerns after strikes affected nine capital cities during 2025–26 (CFR, December 2025).

Outlook

The next phase will depend heavily on what happens inside Iran. The country entered 2026 facing economic protests across all 31 provinces, leaving the regime to manage a foreign war while confronting serious pressure at home (House of Commons Library, 2026). Public frustration may push Tehran toward compromise. It could just as easily encourage the leadership to intensify repression and adopt a more confrontational position abroad.

Washington also faces a consequential choice. It can accept a partial agreement that reduces the immediate threat without resolving every underlying dispute, or continue applying military pressure in pursuit of broader Iranian concessions. The first option carries the risk of leaving Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities partially intact. The second could deepen the conflict without guaranteeing a durable political outcome.

As CFR’s Ray Takeyh observed, achieving a military objective is not the same as securing a lasting political outcome for the Iranian people (NPR, July 13, 2026). That may be the central lesson of this war. Military action can destroy infrastructure, weaken capabilities, and alter calculations. It cannot, by itself, resolve Iran’s internal power struggle or create the conditions for a stable regional order.

For now, the most realistic outcome may be neither peace nor decisive victory, but an unstable cycle of escalation and negotiation. Both sides will continue testing each other’s limits while searching for an agreement they can present domestically as a success. The danger is that, before they find it, one more strike or miscalculation could push the region into a war that becomes far harder to contain.

References

Alhurra. (2026, June 16). Exclusive: IRGC Tightens Grip in Iran. https://alhurra.com/en/21884.

Al Jazeera. (2026, June 16). Hardliners and moderates: What do Iran’s factions think of deal with US? https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/16/hardliners-and-moderates-what-do-irans-factions-think-of-deal-with-us

Al Jazeera. (2026, July 16). Iran says seven killed in latest US strikes, warns war ‘will spread’. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/16/us-mounts-sixth-straight-night-of-attacks-as-iran-warns-of-wider-war

Britannica. (2026). 2026 Iran war. https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iran-war

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2026, April 3). Who Will Be Iran’s Next Supreme Leader? https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/03/iran-supreme-leader-succession-khamenei-mojtaba-arafi

Council on Foreign Relations / Ewers, E., & Tabatabai, A. (2026, April 15). How the Iran War Confirmed, Contradicted, and Complicated U.S. Policy. https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-the-iran-war-confirmed-contradicted-and-complicated-u-s-policy

Council on Foreign Relations. (2025, December 18). Five Takeaways From CFR’s 2026 Conflict Risk Assessment. https://www.cfr.org/articles/five-takeaways-cfrs-2026-conflict-risk-assessment

Council on Foreign Relations. (2026, February 24). After Khamenei: Planning for Iran’s Leadership Transition. https://www.cfr.org/reports/leadership-transition-in-iran

Critical Threats Project. (2026, July 11). Iran Update Special Report. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-july-11-2026

Foreign Affairs. (2026, March 20). The New Khamenei. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/new-khamenei

House of Commons Library. (2026). US-Iran ceasefire and nuclear talks in 2026. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10637/

Iran News Update. (2026, June). Khamenei’s Successor Faces His First Political Crisis as Iran’s Internal Divisions Deepen. https://irannewsupdate.com/news/infightings/khameneis-successor-faces-his-first-political-crisis-as-irans-internal-divisions-deepen/

17GEN4 News. (2026, April 20). IRGC Seizes Full Control of Iran, Sidelines Moderates. https://www.michaelrcronin.com/post/irgc-seizes-full-control-of-iran-sidelines-moderates-17gen4-news

NPR / Takeyh, R. (2026, July 13). What’s next for the U.S. and Iran? An expert weighs in. https://www.npr.org/2026/07/13/nx-s1-5890889/whats-next-for-the-u-s-and-iran-an-expert-weighs-in-on-the-current-situation

Soufan Center. (2026). Next Steps on the U.S.-Iran Agreement. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-june-22/